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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judqment 
entered by Calvin Gould dated the lSth d:1y of June' 1 CJ7<J, 
denying the plaintiff a permanent restrain i nc1 01 ck' . 
DISPOSITION IN LO'l'iER cou1n 
The lower court refused to grant the p1dint iff d pet-"'"\-
nent restraining order and entered an orclet- huJ d 1 "'I th,, l l 11,, 
plaintiffs' property was burdened v.Ji th d th 1 r l y-l h1'c'C ( :,; ') 
foot right-of-way in favor the defcnclitnl';. 
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) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 16642 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment 
entered by Calvin Gould dated the 15th day of June, 1979, 
denying the plaintiff a permanent restraining order. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court refused to grant the plaintiff a perma-
nent restraining order and entered an order holding that the 
plaintiffs' property was burdened with a thirty-three ( 33) 
foot right-of-way in favor the defendants. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek to have this Court reverse the 
decision of the lower court and enter a permanent restraining 
order in favor of the appellants-plaintiffs against the 
defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellants-plaintiffs, Richard Diamond and Peggy 
Diamond, are the owners of property located in Pleasant View, 
Weber County, State of Utah. The right-of-way which is the 
subject matter of this lawsuit extends from a road known as 
900 West in Plesant View City to the east across the property 
owned by the appellants to property owned by the respondents. 
The respondents do not claim that they own the property over 
which the lane or right-of-way passes. The appellants admit 
that there is a right-of-way which has been established by 
use over the years but argue that that right-of-way is 
limited in width between nineteen ( 19) and twenty-one and 
one-half (21-1/2) feet. The respondents, on the other hand, 
claim that the right-of-way should be thirty-three (33) feet 
in width. 
The lane in question was first constructed in approxi-
mately 1926. ( R .176) In the same year a fence was built 
along the lane. The fence was constructed by Farmer Jones 
for the purpose of keeping in his cattle. (R .177, lines 
12 through 15) -Some years later, in approximately 1932, 
a hog-wire fence was constructed along the lane to keep 
-2-
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in livestock. (R.209, lines 16 through 27) Throughout the 
years thereafter, the fences were moved on either side of the 
lane by various parties that owned the property or lived in 
the vicinity. In each case the fence was constructed or moved 
for the purpose of keeping livestock in or out and not for 
the the purpose of establishing a right-of-way or easement. 
(R.209, lines 16 through R.210, line 16) At the time the 
fences were installed the parties installing the fence were 
not concerned with the width of the fence and therefore moved 
the fences at will. When the fences were moved they did not 
at any time interfere with the use of the right-of-way. 
(R.220, lines 8 through 18) 
The right-of-way in question is one lane wide and has 
always been used for travel to and from the respondent's 
property. Over the years the lane has been used by wagons, 
horses, foot traffic and vehicles. At one time the respond-
ents owned a home located on the east of the lane and also 
used the lane for transporting hay, tomatoes and fr4it. 
(R.178, lines 12 through 16) On occasion the lane was used by 
a school bus which consisted of a horse and wagon or sled and 
also by snow removal equipment which consisted of a plow 
drawn by horses. In approximately 1946 the respondents claim 
that they moved a home that was twenty-four (24) feet by 
thirty (30) feet in dimensions down the lane. (R.212, lines 6 
through 14) That was the first and last time that any such 
use of the lane was made. (R.229, lines 6 through 13) 
-3-
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The respondents originally demanded that the appellants 
permit them to have a sixty (60) foot wide right-of-way. 
(R.234, line 19 through R.261, line 14) Thereafter, they 
claimed that they should have a thirty-three (33) foot 
right-of-way. The respondents admit that they have previously 
attended the Planning Commission meeting of Plesant View City 
and were told that they would need a thirty-three ( 33) foot 
right-of-way in order to construct homes on their property. 
(R.232, lines 13 through 27) The respondents attempted to 
introduce evidence to establish that the lane originally was 
thirty-three (33) feet wide. All of the testimony concerning 
the original width of the lane consisted of hearsay and the 
court, on a number of occasions, refused to allow the hearsay 
in, and in fact, ordered that it be stricken from the record. 
(R.179, 181, 200) Even thou<;1h the court would not allow the 
hearsay in, the court then allowed the individuals to 
give their own estimate of the distance without requiring any 
foundation to be laid for_ that testimony. (R.182, lines 14 
through 17) The first witness that estimated the dis-
tance was Lucien V. Critchlow. He stated he estimated the 
distance between the fences as thirty-three (33) feet. 
(R.182, lines 23 through 25) Mr. Critchlow, on cross-examina-
tion, admitted that he did not know how wide the lane was and 
did not measure it. (R.185, lines 2 through 6) He also 
testified that the-right-of-way had always been one lane wide 
-4-
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as that was all that was needed. (R.190, lines 27 through 30) 
The second witness of the respondents, Mr. Max Wade, under 
cross-examination, admitted that the fences could have been 
anywhere from twenty-eight (28) to thirty-three (33) feet 
apart, but he was only guessing. (R.199, lines 13 through 18, 
R.214, lines 10 through 21) Mr. Wade testified that during 
the last six to seven (6-7) years there had been enough room 
to pass on the lane. (R.216, lines 3 through 26) The respond-
ents estimated that the distance between the fences 
originally was about thirty ( 30) to thirty-three ( 33) feet 
wide al though the respondent Robert E. Chri stofferson 
acknowledged that from 1948 to the present time there had not 
been a thirty-three (33) wide right-of-way. (R.260) The gate 
installed by the respondents was twenty (20) feet wide and 
today it is sixteen (16) feet wide. (R.233, lines 10 through 
30) 
In approximately 1968 the appellants replaced a 
fence that was located on the south side of the lane 
and in 1976 the appellants attempted to replace the fence 
on the north side of the lane. In both cases the appellants 
who raise horses in this area replaced the existing wire 
fence with a pole fence. The appellant Richard Diamond 
testified that he had the new fences installed on the 
same line as the existing wire fence. (R.104, lines 10 
through 13, R.115, lines 13 through 17) The north fence 
-5-
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was moved further to the north than the old fence by reason 
of an agreement entered into at the time a hearing was held 
for the temporary restraining order. (R.107, lines 25 through 
30) The new fences are twenty-four and one-half (24-1/2) 
apart on the east and twenty-one (21) feet apart on the west. 
(R.108, lines 6 through 21) One of the appellants' witnesses, 
Bruce Jones, a real estate broker who lives in the vicinity, 
testified that he was hired to replace the north fence and 
that he placed the north fence substantially on the same line 
as the existing wire fence that was located to the north of 
the lane. (R.156, lines 24 through 30, R.157, lines 
19 through 22) Mr. Jones also testified that he had per-
sonally known of the lane in question since approximately 
1950 .and that the lane, as it exists today, is substantially 
the same as it was in the year 1950. (R.153, lines 5 through 
13, R.159, lines 22 through 26) 
The chief witness called by the appellants was Keith 
Hansen who is a consulting engineer. In 1957 Mr. Hansen was 
employed by the Plesant View Culinary water Association to do 
survey work in the vicinity of the disputed right-of-way or 
lane. At that time the respondent Glen Chri stofferson was a 
memeber of that water board and was involved in the hiring of 
Keith Hansen. (R.235, line 28 through R.236, line 4) Mr. 
Hansen testified that in 1957, approximately 22 years ago, he 
~urveyed the lan~ in question for the purpose of constructing 
-6-
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a pipeline for the culinary water company. A copy of his 
survey was entered as evidence as Exhibit "F". In 1957 the 
fences that were replaced by the appellants were in place and 
Mr. Hansen es ta bl ished the distances between those fences. 
(R.129, lines 26 through 29) In 1957 the fences which 
paralleled the lane were nineteen (19) feet apart at the east 
end of the lane (R.132, lines 17 through 19) and twenty-one 
and one-half (21-1/2) feet wide at the west end of the lane. 
(R.134, lines 20 through 23) Mr. Hansen also testified that 
he had not discerned any change in the width of the lane 
since 1957. (R.135, lines 16 through 18) Mr. Hansen testified 
that he was able to establish a scale for the aerial photo-
graphs taken of the lane in question by the aerial photograph 
department on May 27, 1958 which had been introduce by the 
appellants as Exhibits "A" 
19) Mr. Hansen testified 
demonstrated that the fence 
and "B". (R.93, lines 9 through 
that the aerial photographs 
lines were approximately twent'y 
(20) to twenty-two 
photographs. (R.136, 
(22) feet 
line 23 
apart as 
through 
indicated by those 
R.137, line 6) Mr. 
Hansen testified that he has not noticed any change in the 
lane since 1957 and that the appellants' fences had not 
changed the width of the lane. (R.135, lines 16 through 18, 
R.145, lines 8 through 11) 
The aerial photographs taken in 1958 introduced as 
Exhibits "A" and "B" show trees located on both sides of the 
-7-
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lane. The appellants testified that the trees in the photo-
graphs were the same ones in existence today. (R.104, lines 
22 through 27). This testimony was submitted by Bruce Jones 
who testified that the trees in the photographs are still in 
existence and are in line with the fence which was replaced 
by the appellants. (R.157, lines 19 through 26, R.162, lines 
16 through 30) The respondents' witness, Mr. Wade, testified 
that he had planted the trees and that no one had used the 
property to the north of the trees since 1950. (R.221, lines 
14 through 23) 
When the appellants attempted to install a pole fence on 
the north, the repondents physically removed the posts and 
threatened physical violence to the appellants if they were 
to again attempt to construct the fence. This caused the 
appellants to seek a permanent restraining order restraining 
the respondents from interferring with the appellants' use of 
the property. By stipulation of counsel it was agreed that 
evidence could be presented to the court concerning the width 
of the lane and any effect that that might have on the fence 
on both the north and south sides of the lane. 
THE COURT 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN RULING 
THAT THE RESPONDENTS HAD ESTABLISHED THAT THEY WERE ENTITLED 
TO A THIRTY-THREE ( 33) FOOT WIDE RIGHT-OF-WAY ACROSS 
THE PROPERTY OF THE APPELLANTS. 
-8-
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This Court, in the case of Richards vs. Pine Ranch, 
Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (1977), reviewed the decision of a trial 
court concerning the establishment of an easement by prescrip-
tion. Concerning the weight to be granted a decision by a 
trial court this court stated: "This is a case in equity and 
we are not bound to recognize the findings of the trial court 
where they appear to be contrary to the evidence. " It is 
the position of the appellants in this case that the Supreme 
Court has the right to review the evidence in this case 
without giving the normal weight that is allowed the findings 
of a trial court judge. 
Judge Gould, in his Memorandum Decision, stated that the 
respondents were only required to demonstrate by pre-
ponderance of the evidence that their easement was 
thirty-three ( 33) feet wide. The Judge stated in part as 
follows: "A true application of the rule of preponderance 
evidence in a civil case is a simple proposition 'is the fact 
alleged more probably true than not true ... ?'" Clearly this 
is not the standard that is required in the state of Utah in 
order to establish a prescriptive use. The Utah Supreme 
Court, on many occasions, has stated that the standard to be 
applied is one of clear and convincing evidence. This court, 
in the case of Peterson vs. Combe, 20 U.2d 376, 438 
P. 2d 545 ( 1968), considered the question of whether or 
not a road was a public road. The court stated 
that the burden must be borne by the party claiming public 
-9-
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use by clear and convincing evidence that constitutionally 
must be justified. This court has consistently held that in 
order to establish or to demonstrate the abandonment of an 
easement the evidence must be clear and convincing and not a 
mere preponderance of the evidence. Buckley vs. Cox, 247 P.2d 
277, 122 Utah 151, Western Gateway Storage Company vs. 
Treseder, 567 P.2d 181 (1977) 
It is the appellants contention that the respondents did 
not .meet the burden of proof that was required to establish 
that their right-of-way was thirty-three (33) feet in width. 
As indicated in the Statement of Facts the respondents pre-
sented testimony to the effect that fences that were 
established after 1926 along the right-of-way were 
thirty-three (33) feet in width. However, this evidence was 
very tenuous. The respondents attempted to enter hearsay 
which was overruled by the Judge ory many occasions and 
stricken from the record. (R. 179, 181, 200) The only testi-
mony presented concerning the width of the road was based 
upon the estimates of the respondents and two ( 2) witnesses 
called by them. Those witnesses, when cross-examined, 
admitted that they had not measured the road and that they 
were not certain of the width of the distance between the two 
(2) fences. (R.185, lines 2 through 6) Likewise, the two (2) 
respondents who testified were unable to give any concrete 
evidence as to the .width existing between the fences. On the 
other hand the appellants were able to establish the distance 
-10-
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between the fences by positive evidence in the nature of a 
survey by a qualified engineer. He stated that the distance 
between the fences for approximately twenty-two ( 22) years 
from 1957 to 1979 was nineteen (19) feet on the east and 
twenty-one and one-half (21-1/2) feet on the west. (R.132, 
lines 7 through 19, R.134, lines 20 through 23) 
The appellants introduced evidence contained in aerial 
photographs marked as Exhibits "A" and "B" which demonstrate 
that as early as 1958 there were trees located on both the 
north and south sides of the lane. These trees, as indicated 
in the Statement of Facts, are the same ones that presently 
exist. Consequently, it would have been impossible for the 
respondents to have used any greater width than delineated by 
the trees located long the lane. The dimensions of the aerial 
photographs indicated that the maximum width between the 
trees is twenty-two ( 22) feet. It is the position of the 
appellants that estimates on the part of witnesses who have 
never measured the right-of-way cannot constitute evidence 
which is clear and convincing as required by this court. 
The majority of the evidence presented by the respond-
ents was to the effect that they estimated the distance 
between the existing fences to be thirty-three (33) feet. Of 
course, the distance between the fences did not establish the 
right-of-way that had been created by use on the part of the 
respondents 010 their predecessor in interest. The testimony 
-11-
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at the trial was clear that the fences had been constructed 
not for the purpose of delineating the width of the 
right-of-way but to restrain cattle, hogs and other stock. 
(R.209, line 16 through R.210 line 16) Consequently, the 
width between the fences is not competent evidence upon which 
the court can establish 
established by an easement. 
the width of a right-of-way 
Likewise, the fact that the trial 
court judge observed wire on trees outside of the present 
fence line has no significance. (R.18) 
This issue was addressed by this court in the case of 
Anderson vs. Osguthorp, 29 U.2d 32, 504 P.2d 1000 (1972) That 
case involved an easement by 
established by adverse possessioin. 
prescription and rights 
The appellants attempted 
to rely upon a fence line to establish a boundary for their· 
easement. However, the court stated that where the fence was 
erected to prevent cattle from getting on the highway, it 
could not constitute evidence which would establish the loca-
tion and boundary of an easement by prescription. A similar 
decision was reached in the case of Krencicki vs. Petersen, 
22 Ariz.App. 1, 522 P.2d 762 (1974) In that case the court 
held in a case involving easements by prescription that a 
roadway did not extend to fences located on either side of 
the roadway but was limited to the beaten path or the actual 
part of the roadway which had been used by the parties and 
not by the land enclosed by the fences. Consequently, the 
respondents were required to prove not that the original 
-12-
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fences were thirty-three (33) feet apart but that the 
travelled portion of the right-of-way or beaten path was in 
fact thirty-three (33) feet wide. 
The only evidence presented by the respondents to demon-
strate the actual width of the right-of-way used by them was 
testimony to the fact that the respondents' parents had at 
one time owned a home at the east end of the lane and that 
the lane had been used for foot travel, horse and wagon 
and motorized vehicle. The respondents were very vague as to 
the years in which the various types of traffic were used. 
However, they testified that on occasion, the various 
vehicles used on the lane had turned around on the lane 
itself. One witness testified that a truck used to pick up 
fruit or produce had turned around within the fence line 
.although it 
through 18) 
was very difficult to do. (R.180, lines 11 
This witness testified that he did not know how 
long the truck was. Mac Wade testified that he turned a snow 
plow around which was drawn by horses and one of the respond-
ents testified that a wagon drawn by a horse was turned 
around in the lane. None of these witnesses were able to 
indicate the room that would be needed to turn around these 
various vehicles. Neither could they testify that the lane 
had been used consistently for a period of twenty (20) years 
for the purpose of turning vehicles or animals. The respond-
ents did testify that on one occasion in 1946 a house was 
-13-
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moved from the east of the lane to the west that was 
twenty-four (24) feet by thirty (30) feet wide. 
It is the position of the appellants that the respond-
ents must be able to demonstrate, not an isolated used of the 
property during the twenty (20) years, but that the proper~ 
was used consistently and regularly for a particular type of 
travel. The fact that a home may have been moved down the 
road once during the entire prescriptive period would not be 
sufficient to demonstrate that the right-of-way was in fact 
as wide as the home. Likewise, the fact that at times 
vehicles were turned around is not sufficient. There was no 
testimony that this use continued for twenty (20) years or 
was anything other than occasional. 
This, of course, is an equitable action and, conse-
quently, the court must review all of the evidence and the 
ultimate decision in light of the principles of equity which 
control. The appellants believe that those equitable 
principles wer;e well set forth in the case of North Union 
Canal Company vs. Daniel E. Newell, et al, 550 P.2d 178 
(Utah, 1976) The court in that case stated in part as follows: 
.The dispute between these 
parties provokes these observations: 
Whenever there is ownership of pro-
perty subject to an easement there 
is a dichotomy of interest, both of 
which must be respected and kept in 
balance. One the one hand, it is to 
be realized ±hat the owner of the fee 
-14-
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title, because of his general owner-
ship, should have the use and enjoy-
ment of his property to the highest 
degree possible, not inconsistent 
with the easement. On the other, the 
owner of the easement should likewise 
have the right to use and enjoy his 
easement to the fullest extent possible 
not inconsistent with the rights of the 
fee owner. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN RULING THAT THE 
RESPONDENTS HAD NOT ABANDONED PART OF THE RIGHT-OF- WAY BY 
NON-USE FOR A PERIOD EXCEEDING TWENTY (20) YEARS. 
The evidence in this case is very clear that.for approxi-
mately twenty-two (22) years the fences on either side of the 
right-of-way in question restricted the right-of- way so that 
it was no more than nineteen (19) feet at the east end and 
twenty-one and one-half (21-1/2) feet wide at the west end. 
This fact was established by reason of a survey made by Keith 
Hansen, a consulting engineer, in 1957. (R.132, lines 17 
through 19, R.134, lines 20 through 23) One of the witnesses, 
Bruce Jones, testified that the fences and the lane have not 
changed since 1950 which would make the restriction at least 
twenty-nine (29) years in duration. (R.158, lines 21 through 
26) One of the respondents' witnesses, Mac Wade, testified 
that the fences that were surveyed by the engineer Kei tl:i 
Hansen were installed by Mr. Alkema in 1942. (R.211, lines 20 
through 24) One of the respondents, Robert E. Christofferson, 
testified that he had not used and did not need to use any 
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greater width than that 
established by Mr. Alkema. 
clear from this testimony 
contained within the fences 
(R.264, lines 5 through 20) It is 
that the respondents have been 
restricted in the lane width to nineteen ( 19) feet on the 
east and twenty-one and one-half (21-1/2) feet on the west 
for a period of thirty- seven (37) years. This is sub-
stantiated by the testimony of the respondent Robert E. 
Christofferson to the effect that for approximately 
thirty-one (31) years there had not been a lane in existence 
that was thirty-one ( 31) 
R.261, line 1) One 
feet wide. ( R. 260, 1 ine 26 through 
of the other respondents, Glen 
Christofferson, testified that the widest object that had 
been moved along the right-of-way since 1947 was a twenty 
(20) foot wide harrow. (R.234, lines 1 through 5) 
It was undisputed that for a period of between twenty-
two ( 22) and thirty-seven ( 37) years the right-of-way has 
existed in its present width which is nineteen ( 19) fe~t at 
the east and twenty-two and one-half ( 22-1/2) feet at the 
west. The court, in its Memorandum Decision, stated: "There 
has been a continuous use of the right-of-way over a portion 
somewhat narrower than was originally used". (R.18) The legal 
question then is whether or not such a restriction over this 
period of time constitutes an abandonment. of part of the 
width of the lane assuming that the lane was in fact 
thirty-three ( 33) feet wide when it was originated. Judge 
Gould, in his Memorandum Decision, indicated that evidence of 
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non-use was not sufficient to evidence abandonment as there 
must be a demonstration of an intent in addition to the 
non-use. Judge Gould also cited two cases in his Memorandum 
Decision. Apparently one is a case in the Southwest and 
incorrectly cited. The other case was Bradley vs. Frazier 
Park Playgrounds, 242 P.2d 958. This is a California case and 
the court made a very brief reference to the elements neces-
sary to prove abandonment. It merely states: "Second, merely 
non-use does not necessarily constitute abandonment". 
It is the position of the appellants that intent must be 
determined from the circumstances surrounding the non-use and 
that non-use for a period of twenty (20) years is sufficient 
to establish an abandonment and the intent to abandon. This 
court, in the case of King vs. Fronk, 15 U. 2d 135, 378 P. 2d 
1893 ( 1963), in considering a case involving ownership by 
acquiescence stated "Besides, a visible persistent boundary 
having been shown over a period of time is convincing 
evidence of an intent or acquiesce in boundary. 
appellants believe that the same standard can be used 
The 
to 
determine the intent of the respondents as it relates to the 
width of this right-of-way. The intent of the parties must be 
derived from their conduct or lack of conduct under the 
circumstances. In this case the respondents, for a period of 
twenty-two (22) to thirty-seven (37) years failed to use any 
greater width_ than was allowed by the fences existing on 
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either side of the lane. They did not move any vehicles or 
equipment down the lane that exceeded twenty ( 20) feet in 
width and they did not at any time remove the fences or 
request that they be removed. Such action not only 
the demonstrates the width of the right-of-way needed by 
respondents but also the fact that they intended to be 
restricted to the width confined within the fences. The first 
time that the respondents became 
was when they were informed by 
Commission that they would need 
concerned about the width 
the Pleasant View Planning 
thirty-three ( 33) feet in 
order to be able to build a home or homes at the end of the 
lane. 
Judge Gould, in his Memorandum Decision, states 
that there is no evidence to demonstrate adverse use 
of the lane within the thirty-three (33) foot right-of-way 
claimed by the respondents. (R.20) This conclusion on 
the part of the court is absolutely incorrect. The respond-
ents and their witnesses testified that the fences had 
been moved to the present position by Mr. Alkema and 
that the fences were installed for the purpose of fencing 
in cattle and livestock. The fences had been known to 
the respondents for a period of approximately thirty-eight 
(38) years and are clearly visible. 
use which is adverse to the rights 
Open and notorious 
of the respondents 
is all that is required to show adverse possession. The 
lane involved has always belonged to the appellants and 
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their predecessors in 
appellants have always 
in question. Under the 
interest and, consequently, the 
paid the taxes on the property 
laws of the state of Utah that 
is all that is needed to establish adverse use. 
The respondents testified that they had installed 
a gate at the end of the lane that was twenty (20) feet 
in width. This gate belongs to the respondents and was 
installed by them. It is difficult to understand how 
they can claim that they should have a thirty-three (33) 
foot right-of-way 
a gate that would 
through that gate 
when they themselves have installed 
prohibit any item from being taken 
which exceeds the width of the gate. 
This act is clear evidence of the fact that the parties 
intended that the lane width be restricted to at least 
twenty (20) feet. (R.233, lines 17 through 23) 
Utah, for many years, has recognized the fact that an 
easement by prescription can be abandoned. In the case of 
Richards vs. Pine Ranch, Inc., supra, the court, in con-
sidering the question of whether or not a right-of-way by 
prescription had been established stated as follows: "If a 
twenty year adverse use was established, then that.could only 
be defeated by a prohibition of use for a like period". A 
similar decision was reached in the case of Western Gateway 
Storage Company vs. Treseder, supra. Many other states have 
also ruled that an easement may be lost or abandoned through 
non-use. In Busdui vs. State, 409 P.2d 735 (Ariz.App. 1966), 
-19-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Arizona Supreme Court stated that an easement may be 
extinguished by an owner of the subservient estate by acts 
which are adverse to the existence of the easement and which 
continue for a period sufficient to establish title by 
adverse possession. A similar decision was reached in a 
California Appellant Court in the case of Hansen vs. Daniel, 
289 P.2d 50 (Cal.App.). The California court stated that an 
easement may be extinguished by non-use and abandonment and 
by the use of the subservient estate in a manner adverse to 
the exercise of the easement for a period equalling that 
which is required to establish the easement. In a Kansas 
case, Smith vs. Harris, 311 P.2d 325, the court held that an 
easement may be terminated by actions on the part of the 
subservient estate owner of such a nature that it would 
entitle the owners of the dominant estate to maintain an 
action for obstruction of the easement. The Nevada Supreme 
Court, in the case of Brooks vs. Jensen, 483 P.2d 650, stated 
that an easement may be lost if it is shown that the dominant 
estate intended to abandon the easement and that non-use of 
the easement is evidence of such an intent. 
While this is not a case of boundary acquiescence, 
it certainly is similar in many respects. 
has held on numerous occasions that when 
allowed to exist by the parties for a 
The Utah Court 
a boundary is 
long period of 
time without pretest, there is established an implied 
agreement based upon the passage of time that the boundaries 
are accurate. King vs. Fronk, supra. 
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It is the position of the appellants that they do not 
need to show that the respondents intended to abandon the 
entire right-of-way. If the dominant estate owner can abandon 
a right-of-way certainly he can abandon a portion of the 
right-of-way. Consequently, if the respondents ever did own a 
right-of-way thirty-three (33) feet in width, they 
abandoned that width by allowing a restriction on it that was 
clear and visible and known to the respondents for a period 
of thirty-seven (37) years. 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
It is the contention of the appellants that the trial 
court committed prejudicial error in not requiring the 
respondents to prove their claim by clear and convincing 
evidence as required by state law. The respondents did not 
carry the burden of proving that the lane in question had 
ever been thirty-three ( 33) feet in width or that the uses 
they relied upon continued uninterrupted for a period· of 
twenty (20) 
the court 
years. The appellants also contend that even if 
finds that the respondents sustained their burden 
that the evidence clearly demonstrates that the of proof 
respondents abandoned part of said right-of-way and that the 
easement thereon terminated by reason of the fact that the 
right-of-way has only been nineteen (19) to twenty-one and 
one-half (21-1/2) feet for between twenty-two (22) and 
thirty-seven (37) years and in fact has been encumbered with 
fence lines and uses the entire period of time. Consequently, 
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the appellants pray for the court to grant a permanent 
restraining order restraining the respondents from 
interferring with the construction and maintenance of a fence 
line by the appellants. In the alternative, the appellants 
request that this matter be referred back to the trial court 
for a new trial in light of the fact that the court applied 
the rule of preponderance of evidence rather than clear and 
convincing evidence. 
DATED this -,1/'_ day of January, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/A{~d&Ac. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to the attorney for the 
respondents, Richard Richards, Esq., 2506 Madison, Ogden, 
Utah 84401, on this _jj__ day of January, 1980. 
~\ ' //~ '-J~~(o. 
[/JEANNINE c. DAMEWORH 
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